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I Comments I
Taking Judicial Notice of the Genocide in
Rwanda: The Right Choice
Rebecca Faulkner*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the Roman Catholic Church compound in Shangi, Rwanda,
bloody handprints remain on the walls as a gruesome reminder of the
Hutu massacre of Tutsis that occurred on April 18, 1994.1 In one room,
handprints stretch from floor to ceiling, showing how Tutsis stood on one
another's shoulders in desperate efforts to reach ceiling crawl spaces and
the roof in order to hide from Hutu militiamen.2 Other rooms are bullet-
pocked or partially blown apart by hand grenades.3 Although no one
knows for sure, it is estimated that as many as 4,000 Tutsis-adults and
children alike-were hacked, shot, or beaten to death at the Shangi
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University, 2009; Bachelor of Arts, Wheaton College, Norton, Massachusetts, 2006.
Special thanks to my family and friends who supported and encouraged me during the
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1. See Jonathan C. Randal, A Mosaic of Bloody Handprints Recalls 4,000 Tutsis'
Last Day of Life, WASH. POST, June 29, 1994, at A 17.
2. See id.
3. See id.
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church that day.4 As horrifying as the events at Shangi are, they mark
just a fraction of the Tutsis massacred throughout Rwanda in the span of
just four months in the summer of 1994. 5
Following the atrocities committed against Rwandan Tutsis, the
United Nations formed the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR" or "Tribunal") to prosecute those accused of these heinous
6
acts. The ICTR has since tried dozens of cases and uncovered evidence
of genocide on a large scale.7 Yet, until recently, the Tribunal addressed
the issue of genocide in Rwanda as an issue of fact for the prosecutor to
prove in each case.8 However, on June 16, 2006, in Prosecutor v.
Karemera, et al., the Appeals Chamber for the ICTR issued a decision
upholding the Prosecutor's interlocutory appeal and taking judicial notice
of the fact that "[b]etween 6 April 1994 and 17 July 1994, there was a
genocide in Rwanda against the Tutsi ethnic group" as a fact of common
knowledge. 9 Taking judicial notice of genocide in Rwanda means that
the prosecutor in this and future cases need no longer offer evidence to
prove that genocide occurred; the fact of genocide in Rwanda is now
beyond argument. 10 With the evidence compiled in ICTR cases, like the
bloody handprints left at Shangi, the Tribunal's decision is difficult to
dispute.
4. See id.
5. See Gabriel Packard, Rwanda: Census Finds 937,000 Died in Genocide, N.Y.
AMSTERDAM NEWS, Apr. 8, 2004, at 2-2.
6. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, www.ictr.org (follow "About
the Tribunal" hyperlink; then follow "General Information" hyperlink) (last visited Jan.
11,2009).
7. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 6 (follow "Cases"
hyperlink; then follow "Status of Cases" hyperlink).
8. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR 97-21-T, 127-28 (May
15, 2002) (declining to take judicial notice of genocide, "prefer[ing] in the circumstances
of the present case to hear evidence and arguments on this issue, rather than to take
judicial notice of those legal conclusions"); Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No ICTR 98-
44A-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Judicial Notice Pursuant to Rule 94 of
the Rules, 19 (Apr. 16, 2002) (declining to take judicial notice of genocide in Rwanda);
Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-I, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for
Judicial Notice and Presumptions of Facts Pursuant to Rules 94 and 54, 36 (Nov. 3,
2000) (declining to take judicial notice of genocide because "the question is so
fundamental, that formal proofs should be submitted bearing out the existence of this
jurisdictional element crime"); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T,
Judgment, 273 (May 21, 1999) (holding that the question of genocide is so fundamental
to the case against the accused that the Trial Chamber feels obligated to make a finding of
fact on the issue).
9. Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73(C), Decision on
Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, 33-35 (June 16,
2006).
10. See Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-I, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for
Judicial Notice and Presumptions of Facts Pursuant to Rules 94 and 54, 17.
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Yet the Appeals Chamber's ruling in Karemera took many
observers by surprise, for prosecutors had asked the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of the genocide in Rwanda in past cases without success."
Aside from the novelty of this decision, commentators question the
prudence of the Appeals Chamber's decision, arguing that it is unwise
and illogical, 12 as well as conceptually flawed. 13  This Comment
examines the issue of judicially noticing genocide in Rwanda and argues
that it is a positive step in the right direction. In responding to arguments
against judicially noticing the genocide in Rwanda, this Comment is
divided into three principle sections. The first section discusses the
historical context of violence in Rwanda and the procedural context of
Prosecutor v. Karemera. The second section provides a more detailed
discussion of judicial notice and the ways in which that term has been
defined. Finally, the third section addresses the ICTR's decision to take
judicial notice of the genocide in Rwanda in Prosecutor v. Karemera.
Discussion of Karemera is further divided into four subsections: an
explanation of the Appeals Chamber's reasons for noticing genocide; an
examination of the arguments against noticing genocide; a response to
the arguments against noticing genocide; and an argument in support of
noticing genocide.
II. HISTORICAL AND PROCEDURAL CONTEXT
A. A Brief History of Violence in Rwanda
Rwanda has long been a country of conflict. From its earliest days,
discord between its two major ethnic groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis,
has divided the country.14 In 1916, Rwanda became a Belgian colony. 15
11. See Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-R94, Decision on
Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 6 (Nov. 9, 2005) (citing Prosecutor v.
Niyitegeka, Case No. 96-14-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Judicial Notice
of Facts (Sept. 4, 2002); Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR 97-21-T; Kajelueli, Case No
ICTR 98-44A-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Judicial Notice Pursuant to
Rule 94 of the Rules; Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. 96-1 0-T, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts (Nov. 22, 2001); Semanza,
Case No. ICTR 97-20-I, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Judicial Notice and
Presumptions of Facts Pursuant to Rules 94 and 54).
12. See Ralph Mamiya, Taking Judicial Notice of Genocide? The Problematic Law
and Policy of the Karemera Decision, 25 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 1 (2007).
13. See Brittan Heller, Noticing Genocide, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101, 101
(2006).
14. See Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC NEWS, Apr. 1, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1288230.stm.
15. See United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country Profiles:
Rwanda, http://www.fco.gov.uk (follow "Country profiles" hyperlink; then follow "Sub
Saharan Africa" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 11, 2009).
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Believing the Tutsis to be superior to the Hutus, 16 the Belgians gave the
Tutsis almost all of the political power, 7 further fueling the animosity
between the two ethnic groups. Over time, tensions mounted, and
violent clashes occurred sporadically.' 8  On April 6, 1994, however,
Rwanda exploded into chaos with the assassination of its president,
Juvenal Habyarimana. 19 Violence erupted between the Hutu majority
and the Tutsi minority, with the Hutu-led interim government advocating
and inciting violence against Tutsis and moderate Hutus. 20 During the
one hundred days that followed President Habyarimana's assassination,
from early April to mid July, the atrocities committed by the Hutu
government led to the slaughter of approximately one million Tutsis and
moderate Hutus,21 and the displacement of many more.22 It was this
wholesale violence against the Tutsis that led the United Nations to form
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States; or more simply, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.23
B. Prosecutor v. Karemera and Judicially Noticing Genocide
Prosecutor v. Karemera24 is one of the cases currently before the
ICTR.25 The three defendants in this case, Edouard Karemera, Mathieu
Ngirumpatse, and Joseph Nzirorera, are charged with committing
heinous crimes in 1994.26 During this time, the defendants were all high-
level officials in the Mouvement R6volutionnaire Nationale pour le
D6veloppement, or National Revolutionary Movement for Development
16. See Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, supra note 14.
17. See United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, supra note 15.
18. For example, in a series of riots beginning in 1959, more than 20,000 Tutsis
were killed, see Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, supra note 14, and
approximately 150,000 fled into neighboring countries, see CIA, The World Fact Book:
Rwanda, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html (last
visited Jan. 11, 2009).
19. See Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, supra note 14.
20. See United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, supra note 15.
21. See Packard, supra note 5.
22. See CIA, supra note 18.
23. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 6 (follow "About the
Tribunal" hyperlink; then follow "General Information" hyperlink).
24. Case No. ICTR 98-44.
25. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 6 (follow "Cases"
hyperlink; then follow "Status of Cases" hyperlink).
26. See Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-I, Amended Indictment,
(Aug. 24, 2005).
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("MRND"), the political party that controlled Rwanda's 1994 interim
27government.   All three were members of the MRND's Steering
Committee 8 Additionally, Karemera served as Minister of the Interior
for the interim government and as the MRND's First Vice-President,29
Ngirumpatse served as the MRND's President,30 and Nzirorera served as
the MRND's National Secretary. 31  Each was charged with using the
power of his position to plan, instigate, order, commit, or otherwise aid
and abet in the planning, preparation, or commission of the crimes
charged in the indictment.32
The Amended Indictment of August 24, 2005 charges each of the
defendants with seven counts.33 The first four counts are pursuant to
Article 2 of the Statute of the Tribunal, and charge the defendants with:
"(i) conspiracy to commit genocide, (ii) direct and public incitement to
genocide, and (iii) genocide, or alternatively (iv) complicity in
genocide. 34 The next two counts are pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute
of the Tribunal, and charge the defendants with: "(v) rape, and
(vi) extermination as crimes against humanity. ' '35  The final count is
pursuant to Article 4 of the Statute of the Tribunal, and charges the
defendants with "(vii) murder and causing violence to health and
physical or mental well-being as serious violations of Article 3 common
to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 1I.,,36 The most
egregious, and arguably the most serious, of these crimes is genocide.37
27. See id. 1-3.
28. Id.
29. See id. 1.
30. See id. 2.
31. See Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-I, 3.
32. See id. 4.
33. See Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-I, Amended Indictment,
(Aug. 24, 2005).
34. Id. (emphasis in the original).
35. Id. (emphasis in the original).
36. Id. (emphasis in the original).
37. Article 2, section 2 of the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda defines genocide as:
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 1994, art. 2(2).
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In its motion filed on June 30, 2005,38 the Prosecutor asked the Trial
Chamber to take judicial notice of the fact that genocide occurred in
Rwanda in 1994 as a fact of common knowledge. 39 The Trial Chamber
held, somewhat contradictorily, that: (1) it does not matter whether
genocide occurred in Rwanda for purposes of the Prosecutor's case
against the accused, for that is not a fact to be proved, and (2) taking
judicial notice of the fact that genocide occurred in Rwanda would lessen
the Prosecutor's obligation to prove his case. n° On November 9, 2005,
the Trial Chamber therefore denied the Prosecutor's motion as it related
to judicial notice of genocide.4'
Unhappy with this decision, the Prosecutor filed a motion for
certification to appeal the Trial Chamber's decision in an interlocutory
appeal and on December 2, 2005, the Trial Chamber granted this
motion.4' After carefully reviewing the issue de novo, the Appeals
Chamber agreed with the Prosecutor and held that "the fact that genocide
occurred in Rwanda in 1994 should have been recognized by the Trial
Chamber as a fact of common knowledge. 43  The Appeals Chamber
then remanded the matter to the Trial Chamber for further consideration
consistent with the Appeals Chamber's decision.44 The case is currently
back before the Trial Chamber.45
III. JUDICIAL NOTICE
Before determining whether the Appeals Chamber's ruling in
Prosecutor v. Karemera was a prudent decision, it is important to discuss
the concept of judicial notice itself. Judicial notice is an important and
powerful tool for courts. By taking judicial notice of a fact, the court
relieves the prosecutor of his formal burden of producing evidence of
38. See Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-R94, Decision on
Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice (Nov. 9, 2005).
39. Additionally, the Prosecutor asked the Trial Chamber to take judicial notice of
five other facts of common knowledge and 153 facts that had been previously adjudicated
in other ICTR cases. For purposes of this Comment, however, these additional facts are
unimportant. See id. 7.
40. Id.
41. See id. 6.
42. See Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Certification of
Appeal Concerning Judicial Notice (Dec. 2, 2005).
43. Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73(C), Decision on
Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, 135 (June 16, 2006).
44. See id. 57.
45. See id. (remanding the matter to the Trial Chamber for further consideration in a
manner consistent with the Appeals Chamber's Decision).
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that fact at trial. 46 Thus, judicial notice expedites the trial process47 by
reducing the necessary amount of evidence and witnesses, and promotes
the efficiency of the court.48  It also fosters judicial economy 49 and
ensures the consistency and uniformity of decisions .5  Yet, as important
as these traits are to the judicial process, they must be balanced against
the court's equally important "mandate to ensure a fair and equitable trial
for the Accused.,
51
A. The ICTR's Definition of Judicial Notice
Rule 94 of the ICTR's Rules of Procedure and Evidence states that:
(A) A Trial Chamber shall not require proof of facts of common
knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof.
(B) At the request of a party or proprio motu, a Trial Chamber, after
hearing the parties, may decide to take judicial notice of adjudicated
facts or documentary evidence from other proceedings of the
Tribunal relating to the matter at issue in the current proceedings.
In addition to dealing with different types of facts-those of common
knowledge and those that have been previously adjudicated-the two
subsections have one major difference: Rule 94(A) is mandatory while
Rule 94(B) is discretionary.53 Thus, the applicable subsection may make
a great deal of difference to the ultimate outcome. While both
subsections are important and useful tools when dealing with judicial
notice, the remainder of this Comment discusses Rule 94(A) exclusively,
for in Karemera, the Appeals Chamber took judicial notice of genocide
only as a fact of common knowledge.54 Regardless of the subsection
46. See Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-I, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Motion for Judicial Notice and Presumptions of Facts Pursuant to Rules 94
and 54, 1 17 (Nov. 3, 2000).
47. See id. 20.
48. See Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Motion for Judicial Notice, 2 (Apr. 30, 2004).
49. Id.
50. See Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-1, 20.
51. Id. 18.
52. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 2006 ICTR Acts & Docs. Rule 94.
53. See id. (Rule 94(A) uses the language "shall" while Rule 94(B) uses the
language "may" when discussing judicial notice.).
54. See Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73(C), Decision on
Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, 38 (June 16,
2006)(taking judicial notice of genocide in Rwanda as a fact of common knowledge).
Although there may be strong arguments for taking judicial notice of the genocide in
Rwanda under Rule 94(B), for the sake of brevity and simplicity I will leave that
discussion for another comment.
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used, however, Rule 94 provides no guidance as to what constitutes a
fact of "common knowledge" or an "adjudicated fact. 55 The Tribunal
has therefore had to provide definitions for these phrases through its
jurisprudence.
In Prosecutor v. Semanza, 56 the Trial Chamber closely examined the
issue of judicial notice, focusing primarily on prominent legal treatises in
order to formulate a definition for facts of common knowledge. 57 It
determined that a fact of common knowledge is one that is not subject to
reasonable dispute.58 The Trial Chamber went on to state that a fact is
not subject to reasonable dispute if "it is either generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of a court or capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
called into question." 59 The Trial Chamber listed the days of the week,
general historical facts, geographical facts, and the laws of nature as
examples of facts that meet this test for facts of common knowledge.6°
The Tribunal also considered judicial notice in Prosecutor v.
Bizimungu.61  In its December 2, 2003 decision, the Trial Chamber
determined that facts of common knowledge are those facts that are "of
such notoriety, so well known and acknowledged that no reasonable
individual with relevant concern can possibly dispute them.,
62
Based on the Trial Chamber's decisions in Semanza and Bizimungu,
the Tribunal has developed a more precise definition of facts that
constitute "common knowledge" than that provided by Rule 94(A)
alone.63 It is this definition that the Trial Chamber should have applied
in Karemera when determining whether to take judicial notice of
genocide in Rwanda. And it is this definition that this Comment will use
to argue that the Appeals Chamber made the right decision when it
granted the Prosecutor's motion for judicial notice.
55. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 2006 ICTR Acts & Docs. Rule 94.
56. Case No. ICTR 97-20.
57. See Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-1, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Motion for Judicial Notice and Presumptions of Facts Pursuant to Rules 94
and 54, T 22 (Nov. 3, 2000).
58. See id. 23.
59. Id. 24.
60. See id. 23.
61. See Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al., Case No. ICTR 99-50-I, Decision On
Prosecution's Motion for Judicial Notice Pursuant to Rules 73, 89 and 94, (Dec. 2, 2003).
62. Id. 23.
63. See generally Bizimungu, Case No. ICTR 99-50-I (explaining that facts of
common knowledge are facts that are notorious and so well known and acknowledged
that they cannot reasonably be disputed by an individual with relevant concern); see also
Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-I (explaining that facts of common knowledge are facts
that are not subject to reasonable dispute because they are either generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of a court or capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned).
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B. The ICTY's Definition of Judicial Notice
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") is a tribunal very similar to the ICTR. The ICTY was
established in 1993, in response to violations of international
humanitarian law that occurred in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
in 1991.64 Looking at the ICTY's interpretation of judicial notice is
relevant to the ICTR for a number of reasons. First, the ICTY served as
a model for the establishment of the ICTR, and the ICTR drew in whole
or in substantial part on many of the ICTY's basic legal texts, including
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.65 Important for purposes of this
Comment, the ICTR's rule of evidence on judicial notice, Rule 94, is the
same as the ICTY's rule, also Rule 94.66 Second, and even more
important for purposes of this Comment, the two tribunals share one
Chamber of Appeals. 67  For these reasons, much of what the two
tribunals do is closely linked, so understanding the ICTY's interpretation
of judicial notice is helpful to understanding the ICTR's view.
Unlike the ICTR, the ICTY has not been asked to take judicial
notice of genocide. It has been asked, however, to take judicial notice of
facts under Rule 94(A) in a number of cases,68 and so like the ICTR, it
has interpreted the language of Rule 94(A) to make it more useful. 69 For
64. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, www.icty.org
(follow "Welcome to the New ICTY Website" hyperlink; then follow "The About
section" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 11, 2009).
65. Compare Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 2007 ICTY Acts & Docs. and Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, 2006 ICTR Acts & Docs.
66. In fact, the two rules are nearly identical. The ICTR adopted Rule 94(A)
verbatim, and changed Rule 94(B) only slightly: the ICTY's rule states that the Tribunal
may take judicial notice of facts "relating to matters at issue," Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, 2007 ICTY Acts & Docs. Rule 94(A), while the ICTR's version states that the
Tribunal may take judicial notice of facts "relating to the matter at issue," Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, 2006 ICTR Acts & Docs. Rule 94(A).
67. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 64
(follow "Welcome to the New Website" hyperlink; then follow "Chambers" hyperlink).
68. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Marijacic, Case No. IT 95-14-R77.2, Decision on
Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence (Jan. 13, 2006)
(Prosecution request asking the Trial Chamber to take judicial notice of documents
falling into one of three categories: newspaper articles; court documents of the
International Tribunal; and selected Croatian laws); Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT 95-
9, Decision on Defense Request for Trial Chamber to Take Judicial Notice (July 7, 2000)
(Defense request asking the Trial Chamber to take judicial notice of the Prosecution's
position, as reflected in the Weekly Press Briefing issued by the International Tribunal on
June 14, 2000).
69. See, e.g., Nikolic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT 02-60/1-A, Decision on Appellant's
Motion for Judicial Notice (Apr. 1, 2005); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT 02-54-
AR73.5, Decision on the Prosecution's Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial Chamber's
10 April 2003 Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts
(Oct. 28, 2003).
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example, in Prosecutor v. Milosevic,70 the Appeals Chamber,
recognizing that "Rule 94(A) [does not] explain what 'facts of common
knowledge' are," defined these facts as material that is notorious.71 In
Nikolic v. Prosecutor,72 the Appeals Chamber went on to state that facts
of common knowledge are facts that are "common or universally known
facts," and must be facts that are "not the subject of reasonable
dispute. 73 Thus, taking judicial notice of facts of common knowledge
implies that those facts cannot be challenged at trial.74
Decisions by both the ICTY and the ICTR interpreting judicial
notice pursuant to Rule 94(A) thus provide a fuller understanding of
what constitutes facts of common knowledge. Facts of common
knowledge are those facts that are notorious, universally known or at
least generally known in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, capable
of accurate and ready determination, and not subject to reasonable
dispute.75 With these definitions, we now have the framework for
concluding that the genocide in Rwanda is a fact of common knowledge,
and that the Appeals Chamber acted properly in Karemera when it took
judicial notice of that fact pursuant to Rule 94(A).
IV. NOTICING GENOCIDE IN KAREMERA
A. The Appeals Chamber's Reasons for Noticing Genocide
In Karemera, the Appeals Chamber provided a number of reasons
supporting its decision to take judicial notice of genocide in Rwanda as a
fact of common knowledge pursuant to Rule 94(A).76 The first reason
was simply that the genocide in Rwanda fits within the definition of a
fact of common knowledge.77 Using the language of Semanza, the
Appeals Chamber stated that "[t]here is no reasonable basis for anyone to
70. Milosevic, Case No. IT 02-54.
71. See Milosevic, Case No. IT 02-54-AR73.5, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial Cahamber's 10 April 2003 Decision on
Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts (Oct. 28, 2003).
72. Nikloic, Case No. IT 02-60.
73. Nikolic, Case No. IT 02-60/1-A, 1 10.
74. See id.
75. See Nikolic Case No. IT 02-60/1-A; Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Case No. ICTR
99-50-1, Decision On Prosecution's Motion for Judicial Notice Pursuant to Rules 73, 89
and 94, (Dec. 2, 2003); Milosevic, Case No. IT 02-54-AR73.5, Decision on the
Prosecution's Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial Chamber's 10 April 2003 Decision
on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts (Oct. 28, 2003);
Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-1, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for
Judicial Notice and Presumptions of Facts Pursuant to Rules 94 and 54 (Nov. 3, 2000).
76. See Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73(C), Decision on
Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice (June 16, 2006).
77. Id. 35.
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dispute that, during 1994, there was a campaign of mass killings to
destroy, in whole or at least in very large part, Rwanda's Tutsi
population., 78 To substantiate this claim, the Appeals Chamber pointed
to United Nations' reports detailing the genocide in Rwanda, which were
a key impetus for the Tribunal's establishment, and the very name of the
Tribunal itself-the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for Genocide.79
The Appeals Chamber's second reason supporting its decision to
take judicial notice of genocide in Rwanda was the fact that it is no
longer necessary for the Tribunal to build the historical record.80 The
Appeals Chamber found that while this role was important during the
early part of the Tribunal's history, "at this stage, the Tribunal need not
demand further documentation.",8 1 The historical record of the genocide
in Rwanda has been thoroughly documented through the Tribunal's
previous judgments, 82 "books, scholarly articles, media reports, U.N.
reports and resolutions, national court decisions, and government and
NGO reports. 8 3  That genocide occurred in Rwanda is a fact that no
longer necessitates proof, it is "a classic instance of a 'fact of common
knowledge." 84 It is therefore an appropriate fact for Rule 94(A) judicial
notice.
A third reason the Appeals Chamber offered in support of its
decision was that, unlike the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber
believed that the issue of judicially noticing genocide is "of obvious
relevance to the Prosecution's case." 85 Although insufficient in itself to
prove the case against the accused, it is a necessary factor.86 Showing a
nationwide campaign of genocide is also relevant because it provides the
87
context within which to understand individual defendants' actions.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73(C), T 35.
82. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, 291
(May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Judgment and
Sentence, 273-472 (May 15, 2003) (providing a lengthy discussion, replete with details,
of specific instances of the genocide that took place in Rwanda); Prosecutor v. Musema,
Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, 316 (Jan. 27, 2000) (setting out
factual findings of massacres that took place in the Bisesero Region of Rwanda);
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 112-126 (Sept. 2, 1998)
(containing a lengthy findings of fact detailing genocide in Rwanda).
83. Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73(C), Decision on
Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, 935 (June 16, 2006)
(footnotes omitted).
84. Id.
85. Id. 36.
86. See id.
87. See id.
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Thus, the Appeals Chamber explicitly rejected the Trial Chamber's first
reason for declining to take judicial notice of the genocide in Rwanda.
Linked with this argument is the Appeals Chamber's response to the
Trial Chamber's second contention, that judicially noticing genocide will
lessen the Prosecutor's burden in convicting the individual accused.88
The Appeals Chamber similarly rejected this argument, stating that even
if the Tribunal takes judicial notice of genocide, the Prosecutor must still
offer evidence demonstrating the individual guilt of each of the
accused. 89 Specifically, in order to prove its case against the defendants
in Karemera, the Prosecutor must show that particular actions by the
accused constitute genocidal conduct, and that each of the accused acted
with the requisite mental state.90 Even with judicial notice of genocide,
without such proof the Prosecutor cannot prove his case against the
defendants. The Appeals Chamber further noted that these proof
requirements serve to protect the procedural rights of the accused. 9
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Appeals Chamber rejected
arguments put forward by the Trial Chamber and the defendants that
genocide in Rwanda is not an appropriate fact for judicial notice. 92 The
Appeals Chamber found that noticing this fact would not truncate the
historical record, lessen the Prosecutor's burden in convicting the
accused, or infringe upon the defendant's procedural rights.93 It further
found that the fact is relevant to the Prosecutor's case.94 Based on the
evidentiary record and the facts known to the Tribunal, the Appeals
Chamber concluded that "[t]here is no reasonable basis for anyone to
dispute that, during 1994, there was a campaign of mass killings intended
to destroy, in whole or at least in very large part, Rwanda's Tutsi
population." 95  Therefore, the Appeals Chamber found that noticing
genocide is appropriate pursuant to Rule 94(A).96
B. Arguments Against Noticing Genocide
While the Appeals Chamber found ample support for its decision
that taking judicial notice of genocide in Rwanda is appropriate, there are
others who disagree. 97 Their reasons for rejecting the decision are many,
88. See Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73(C), 37.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. 38.
93. See Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73(C), 35-37.
94. See id. 36.
95. Id. 35.
96. See id. 38.
97. Since the Appeals Chamber's decision, two comments have been published
criticizing its decision to take judicial notice of genocide: Mamiya, supra note 12 and
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and at first glance some seem persuasive. Most of these arguments aim
to show the imprudence of noticing genocide, and can be placed into two
categories, which I will call "efficiency arguments" and "procedural
arguments" for purposes of this Comment. However, one commentator,
Ralph Mamiya, disagrees with the Appeals Chamber's decision entirely,
and questions whether genocide in Rwanda fulfills the criteria for a fact
of common knowledge at all. 98
In his comment, Taking Judicial Notice of Genocide? The
Problematic Law and Policy of the Karemera Decision,9 9 Mamiya argues
that the genocide in Rwanda is not a fact of common knowledge.' 00 He
concedes that the Rwandan genocide "is, after all, one of the best-known
humanitarian tragedies in history,"'0 ' but argues that the intent aspect of
the definition of genocide precludes this from being an appropriate fact
for judicial notice.'0 2 He contends that, while it is possible for the world
at large to know of the conduct that constitutes genocide, it is not
possible for the general public to know of the specific intent of the
individual perpetrators. 0 3  The types of evidence needed to prove
specific intent-"official memoranda; the testimony of experts; victims
and informants; a comprehensive investigation"a04-are not available to
the world at large. 0 5 He maintains that without such evidence, people
make assumptions based on rumor and published account. While these
assumptions may be generally correct, they are not an appropriate basis
for judicial notice. 0 6 Mamiya thus argues that based on its intent aspect,
genocide is not an appropriate fact for judicial notice.'07
Even setting aside this argument and assuming that genocide may
be an appropriate fact for judicial notice, Mamiya and other
commentators advance a number of additional arguments in an effort to
show that the decision to take judicial notice of genocide in Rwanda was
unwise. 0 8 The first category of arguments contains what I will refer to
as "efficiency arguments." These include arguments that noticing
genocide will truncate the judicial record, impede reconciliation, and
Heller, supra note 13. These commentators argue that the Appeals Chamber's decision
was unwise, illogical, and conceptually flawed.
98. See Mamiya, supra note 12, at 14.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 14-17.
101. Id. at 14.
102. See id. at 16.
103. See Mamiya, supra note 12, at 16.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See, e.g., Mamiya, supra note 12; Heller, supra note 13.
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prove time consuming for future cases.' 0 9 For example, in her comment
Noticing Genocide, 11 Brittan Heller argues that taking judicial notice of
genocide will truncate the judicial record by foreclosing future
discussion about whether genocide occurred, and preventing further
presentation of evidence and testimony."' Mamiya concurs, arguing that
"[o]ne of the most fundamental goals of international criminal fora is to
establish a history of the events that they examine;"" 2 noticing genocide
prevents the Tribunal from setting out an "impartial, detailed, and well-
publicized record"'" 3 of those events. 14  Heller also believes that
noticing genocide will impede reconciliation, for the accused will no
longer be called upon to explain or excuse their actions. 1 5 Finally, she
argues that while judicial notice aims at promoting efficiency, noticing
genocide may actually lead to more time and money spent, due to
attorneys' and defendants' unwillingness to accept the decision and the
resulting appeals." 6 In short, these commentators argue that noticing
genocide conflicts with many of the ICTR's most important efficiency
goals. 117
The second category of arguments against taking judicial notice of
genocide consists of what I will refer to as "procedural arguments."
These include arguments that noticing genocide violates basic legal
principles, as well as the rights of the accused. 1 8 For example, Heller
argues that taking judicial notice of genocide violates basic legal
principles by conflating issues of law with issues of fact."19 She contends
that judicial notice is reserved for factual determinations, and argues that
a finding that genocide occurred is not a fact; it is a legal conclusion that
the elements of a crime have been met.' 20 Another procedural argument
advanced against noticing genocide is that it violates the rights of the
accused.12 ' In Karemera, for instance, the defendants argued that
noticing genocide would prejudice them by removing both the
presumption of innocence and the right to confront their accusers. 122
109. See Heller, supra note 13, at 102-03.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 102-03; see also Mamiya, supra note 12, at 17-18.
112. Mamiya, supra note 12, at 17.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See Heller, supra note 13, at 103.
116. See id.
117. See id.; Mamiya, supra note 13.
118. See Heller, supra note 13, at 103.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73(C), Decision on
Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, 34 (June 16, 2006).
122. See id.
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Together, these arguments consist of the notion that judicial notice of
genocide is inappropriate, for it violates important procedural aspects of
the law.
C. Response to Arguments Against Noticing Genocide
The following section addresses and responds to the arguments set
forth above, and argues that the various reasons presented in opposition
to noticing genocide are unsound. The arguments against noticing
genocide may seem persuasive upon a first reading; however, upon
closer inspection they lose much of their appeal. Aside from Mamiya's
argument that genocide is not a fact of common knowledge at all, 2 3 the
rest of the arguments share one fatal flaw: they disregard the fact that
Rule 94(A) is mandatory rather than discretionary. 24 In what follows,
this Comment will first expand upon this assertion, and then move on to
rebut Mamiya's argument that genocide is not a fact of common
knowledge. 1
25
The first and most problematic issue with all of the arguments
advanced above-with the exception of the argument that genocide is not
a fact of common knowledge at all-is that these arguments disregard
the fact that Rule 94(A) is mandatory.1 26 The rule states: "[a] Trial
Chamber shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but shall
take judicial notice thereof. 1 27 In other words, "the Trial Chamber has
no discretion to determine that a fact, although 'of common knowledge,'
must nonetheless be proven through evidence at trial."'128 Yet, all of the
efficiency and procedural arguments overlook that fact. Instead, the
commentators attempt to show that the Appeals Chamber abused its
discretion because its decision will make the trial more costly or time
consuming, or truncate the judicial record 129-arguments that are
appropriate under Rule 94(B), but not Rule 94(A). If the Tribunal
determines that the genocide in Rwanda is a fact of common knowledge,
the Tribunal must take judicial notice of that fact pursuant to the
mandatory nature of Rule 94(A). There may still be arguments that the
decision is inefficient or procedurally unsound, but those are arguments
not about whether the Appeals Chamber acted correctly in Prosecutor v.
Karemera, but about the Tribunal's wisdom in enacting Rule 94(A). For
this reason, all of the efficiency and procedural arguments fail.
123. See Mamiya, supra note 12, at 14-17.
124. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 2006 ICTR Acts & Docs. Rule 94.
125. See Mamiya, supra note 12, at 14-17.
126. See generally id.; Heller, supra note 13.
127. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 2006 ICTR Acts & Docs. Rule 94(A).
128. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73(C), 23.
129. See generally Mamiya, supra note 12; Heller, supra note 13.
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Regardless of our opinions of the prudence or imprudence of taking
judicial notice of genocide, our first and only inquiry must be whether
the fact that genocide occurred in Rwanda fits the criteria for a fact of
common knowledge.
Ralph Mamiya seems to recognize this to some degree. In his
comment, Mamiya argues that the genocide in Rwanda does not meet
Rule 94(A)'s criteria for a fact of common knowledge because of its
intent element. 130 However, this argument also fails. While it is true that
in proving genocide the Prosecution has the burden of proving specific
intent, or dolus specialis, it is also true that in the case of genocide in
Rwanda there is ample evidence to support such a burden. We may
never have direct evidence of intent, but that should hardly be cause for
concern. Proof of intent is often based on circumstantial evidence-
which can be every bit as convincing as direct evidence-and in the case
of genocide in Rwanda, there is ample circumstantial evidence. Mamiya
himself admits that "the use of radio and public speakers to widely
disseminate the hate-filled messages of 'Hutu Power' made the intent
behind the Rwanda genocide clearer than most.' 131 Further, the fact that
one ethnic group was targeted and that almost half a million people from
that ethnic group were killed within the span of a few months 132 provides
strong circumstantial evidence of genocidal intent.
Mamiya's claim that the types of evidence needed to prove specific
intent--"official memoranda; the testimony of experts; victims and
informants; a comprehensive investigation"133-are not available to the
world at large' 34 is also unpersuasive. The testimony of victims and
informants is available through the transcripts of cases that have already
been completed, as well as cases that are working their way through trial.
Additionally, the inquiry and documentation that went into the
preparation of each of the indictments and trials of ICTR defendants
constitutes a comprehensive investigation. While not every official
memorandum of the interim Hutu government and not every victim may
be available to testify as to the genocidal intent in Rwanda, there is
sufficient evidence available to the world at large to determine that those
in power in Rwanda during the summer of 1994 had a genocidal intent
when they slaughtered the Tutsis.
130. See Mamiya, supra note 12, at 16.
131. Id.
132. See Packard, supra note 5.
133. Mamiya, supra note 12, at 16.
134. See id.
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Furthermore, as the Tribunal noted in the Semanza decision, facts
for judicial notice need not necessarily be known to the world at large. 135
It is enough that the facts are "generally known within a tribunal's
territorial jurisdiction." 136  In this case, the Rwandan genocide is
common knowledge among people in Rwanda. There are many
Rwandans who lived through the ordeal and have first-hand knowledge
of the events that occurred. There are also traces of what happened still
evident in Rwanda, such as the church compound at Shangi. 137 To claim
that genocide is not a fact of common knowledge because of the intent
element of genocide is to deny all of this evidence. While the specific
intent of each individual defendant may not be common knowledge, it is
impossible to overlook all of the relevant evidence that points to the
overall genocidal intent of those in power during the summer of 1994.
The evidence available to those in Rwanda and to the world at large
provides compelling-even if circumstantial-evidence of a genocidal
intent.
There is also ample evidence to support the conduct element of
genocide for judicial notice. The events that occurred during the summer
of 1994 in Rwanda are notorious and capable of accurate and ready
determination. They have been documented in books, 3 8 scholarly
articles, 139 United Nations reports, 14 national court decisions, 41 and
previous ICTR decisions. 4 2 There are also numerous media reports that
document the events.1 43 Even the full name of the Tribunal itself-the
135. See Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-I, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Motion for Judicial Notice and Presumptions of Facts Pursuant to Rules 94
and 54, 23 (Nov. 3, 2000).
136. Id.
137. See Randal, supra note 1.
138. See, e.g., ROBERT LYONS, INTIMATE ENEMY: IMAGES AND VOICES OF THE
RWANDAN GENOCIDE (Zone Books 2006); GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS:
HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (Hurst 1998) (1995).
139. See, e.g., Helen M. Hintjens, Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 37 J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 241 (1999); Alex de Waal, Genocide in Rwanda, 10 ANTHROPOLOGY
TODAY 1 (1994); Peter Uvin, Reading the Rwandan Genocide, 3 INT'L STUD. REV. 75
(2001).
140. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 49/206, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/206 (March 6, 1995); G.A.
Res. 54/188, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/188 (Feb. 9, 2000).
141. See, e.g., Mukamusoni v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2004); Ntakirutimana
v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999).
142. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2,
1998); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment (May 21, 1999);
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence (Jan. 27, 2000);
Proseutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence (May 15, 2003).
143. See, e.g., Donatella Lorch, Rape Used As Weapon in Rwanda/Future Grim for
Genocide Orphans, HOUS. CHRON., May 15, 1995, at 1; Randal, supra note 1; Sebastian
Rotella, Genocide Findings Cause an Uproar; A French Judge Says the Current Rwanda
Leader Plotted the '94 Chaos that Left 800,000 Dead, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at Al.
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide-accepts the fact of genocide in Rwanda as a
fact of common knowledge. In short, that genocide occurred in Rwanda
is beyond reasonable dispute, and Mamiya's contention that the genocide
is not a fact of common knowledge 144 is unfounded.
D. Support for the ICTR's Decision to Notice Genocide
Thus far I have tried to show that genocide is a fact of common
knowledge, and that the arguments against taking judicial notice of the
genocide in Rwanda fail upon closer inspection. However, there are also
many reasons that the decision to take judicial notice was a prudent one
in its own right. In the following section, I will discuss these reasons and
show that even if Rule 94(A) was discretionary, the Tribunal made the
right choice when it took judicial notice of the genocide in Rwanda.
One argument in favor of the Appeals Chamber's decision to notice
genocide is that it promotes the ICTR's judicial efficiency. 145 Judicial
notice aids the tribunal in using its time and financial resources more
efficiently, and thus more effectively. 146  Another argument is that
judicial notice helps the Court to maintain a uniform interpretation of
commonly reviewed facts. 147 Once the Tribunal takes judicial notice of a
certain fact, that fact will be viewed and understood the same for all
cases. This uniformity in turn leads to fairness between defendants in
different cases, for all defendants will be treated similarly.
Another, and perhaps the strongest argument, is that judicially
noticing genocide may play a significant role in the healing process for
many Rwandans, while at the same time maintaining the prosecutor's
burden of proving individual defendants' guilt. By taking judicial notice
of the genocide in Rwanda, the Tribunal publicly acknowledges that the
genocide did, in fact, take place and affirms the strength and courage of
all those Rwandans who lived through the ordeal. It also provides
support against those who would argue that the mass murder of Tutsis
never occurred in Rwanda, preventing something similar to the
Holocaust denial from occurring. .Furthermore, the decision may also
provide some measure of closure, for with acceptance the healing
process can begin.
144. See Mamiya, supra note 12, at 14.
145. See Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Motion for Judicial Notice, T 2, (Apr. 30, 2004).
146. Id.
147. See generally Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-I, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Motion for Judicial Notice and Presumptions of Facts Pursuant to Rules 94
and 54, 20 (Nov. 3, 2000).
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Just as importantly for the Tribunal is the fact that the decision does
these things without lessening the prosecutor's burden of proving the
guilt of the individual defendants in each case. In order to prove its case
against the accused, the prosecutor still has to provide evidence showing
that the conduct and intent elements of genocide can be satisfied as to
each individual defendant. The prosecutor will still be called on to make
his case and carry the burden of proof, while each defendant will still
have the opportunity to disprove the prosecutor's assertions or provide
any defenses that defendant may have. This also provides a resolution to
many of the efficiency arguments made by commentators and discussed
above. By carrying the burden of proof as to each individual defendant,
the prosecutor will actually build the historical record, rather than
truncate it, through the presentation of evidence and testimony about the
conduct and intent of each defendant that appears before the Tribunal.
Thus, there are many reasons that taking judicial notice of the genocide
in Rwanda was a prudent decision by the Appeals Chamber.
V. CONCLUSION
The events that occurred in Rwanda during the summer of 1994
were horrific. Almost one million people were killed based solely on
their ethnicity.1 48 Since that time, prosecutors in many of the cases
before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda had argued that
the fact that genocide occurred in Rwanda should be judicially noticed,
but without success. 149 That is, until the Appeals Chamber took judicial
notice of the Rwandan genocide on June 16, 2006, in Prosecutor v.
Karemera, et al.150 Many commentators have since argued that this was
an unwise decision. 15  However, upon closer inspection all of these
arguments fail. Rule 94(A) provides that the Tribunal shall take judicial
notice of facts of common knowledge, 152 and the genocide in Rwanda fits
the definition of a fact of common knowledge. With all of the
information available to the world at large, and especially to the Tribunal
and its territorial jurisdiction, there is no room left to dispute that the
genocide did in fact occur. Because the genocide is a fact of common
knowledge, and also because it was a good decision, the Appeals
Chamber made the right choice when it took judicial notice of the
genocide in Rwanda.
148. See Randal, supra note 1.
149. See Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-R94, Decision on
Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice (Nov. 9, 2005).
150. Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73(C), Decision on
Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, 38 (June 16, 2006).
151. See, e.g., Mamiya, supra note 12; Heller, supra note 13.
152. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 2006 ICTR Acts & Docs. Rule 94.

